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Silver Coins and Public Slaves
in the Athenian Law of 375/4 B.C.
(PLATE 9) THOMAS R. MARTIN
When I was a student in the Graduate Seminar of the American
Numismatic Society in the summer of 1976, Nancy Waggoner encouraged
me to pursue my interest in the intersection of the evidence of coins and
of literary and documentary sources for ancient Greek history. In this
contribution to honor her memory, I have followed the same approach
in investigating the implications of the provisions of an Athenian law of
375/4 B.C. concerning a special problem in the allocation of power that
silver coinage created for one of the principal ideals of Athenian
democracy. In Athenian public service, ideally no one was supposed to
exercise a power over others that was not subject to regular and effective
review by the citizen body, but the official scrutiny of coinage necessari
ly represented an anomaly in the system. This anomalous power was all
the more striking in that it resided in the hands of public slaves.
The text from 375/4 B.C. that sheds light on this remarkable situation
is an inscription of 56 lines, discovered in the American excavations of
the Athenian agora in 1970 and published with extensive commentary
by Ronald S. Stroud.1 For the arguments of this paper, it will fortunate
ly suffice to summarize the text.2 After a brief opening that records the
1 R.S. Stroud, "An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage," Hesperia 43 (1974), pp. 157-88.
For periodical abbreviations see Numismatic Literature 123 (March 1990), pp. xiii-lxiii. All
dates are B.C.
2 To give a full translation would require extensive discussion of epigraphical uncertain
ties and gaps in the Greek text caused by damage to the stone, for which this is not the
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year in which this law was passed and naming Nicophon as its proposer,
the body of the text begins in l. 3 with the programmatic statement that
Athenian coinage that has been shown to be of silver and to carry the
public coin type must be accepted in financial transactions. (See Plate
9, 1 and 2 for Athenian tetradrachms of the fifth and fourth centuries
respectively). The dokimastes (that is, the public slave who works as the
official certifier of the coinage) is to take his seat among the "tables"
(presumably those of the bankers and money changers of the agora) and
is to be available there every day to certify coinage according to the
specifications listed above, except on the days when financial payments
are being made to the city-state, when he is to be in the council house.
If someone presents a foreign silver coin to the certifier that has the same
type as Athenian coinage (that is, the category of coins that modern
scholars call imitations, to which we will return), the certifier is to return
it to the person who presented it. (Whether the text specified that the
imitation had to be "good" remains controversial; see below.) The cer
tifier is to cut through all counterfeits such as plated subaerate coins and
deposit them with the council under the guardianship of the Mother of
the Gods (see Plate 9, 3 for an example of a plated tetradrachm wihout
such a cut, and Plate 9, 4 for a subaerate with a cut.) If the certifier does
not appear at his designated post or certify coinage according to the pro
visions of the law, the appropriate magistrates are to punish him with
50 lashes of the whip. Anyone who refuses genuine silver coins that have
been certified is to have confiscated all the merchandise that he had on
sale for that day.
appropriate place. Stroud provides a complete English translation with his publication of
the editio princeps. For an English translation that takes into account different suggestions
for restoration published during the period from the appearance of Stroud's article until
1983, see Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, vol. 2: From the End of the Peloponnesian War
to the Battle of Ipsus, P. Harding, ed. and trans. (Cambridge, 1985), no. 45, pp. 61-64. The
following items propose restorations that differ from Stroud's: M.H. Hansen, Eisangelia
(Odense, 1975 = Odense University Classical Studies 6), p. 28; R. Bogaert, Epigraphica
///(Leiden, 1976), no. 21, p. 25; J. and L. Robert, Bulletin Epigraphique 1976, no. 190;
F. Sokolowski, "The Athenian Law Concerning Silver Currency (375/4 B.C.)," BCH 100
(1976), pp. 511-15; P. Gauthier, "Sur une clause penale de la loi athenienne relative a
la monnaie d'argent," Revue de Philologie 52 (1978), pp. 32-35; T. Fischer, "Das Athener
Miinzgesetz von 375/74 v. Chr.," Hellenika: Jahrbuch fur die Freunde Griechenlands (1981),
pp. 38-41; F. Bourriot, "Note sur le texte de la loi athenienne de 375/4 concernant la cir
culation monetaire (loi de Nicophon)," ZPE 50 (1983), pp. 275-82; T.R. Martin, reported
in Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum 33 (1983), no. 77, p. 22; H. Wankel, "Bemerkungen
zu dem athenischen Miinzgesetz von 375/4," ZPE 52 (1983), pp. 69-74; H. Engelmann,
"WegegriechischerGeldpolitik,"ZP£60(1985), pp. 165-76; G. Stumpf, "Ein athenisches
Munzgesetz des 4. Jh. v. Chr.," JNG 36 (1986), pp. 23-40.
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There follow provisions for lodging accusations about offenses under
this law with the appropriate magistrates according to the location at which
the alleged refusal to accept certified coinage took place. Cases concern
ing less than 10 drachmas are to be handled by magistrates; cases of more
than that amount are to be taken before a court of citizens. Those who
make successful accusations are to receive half of the confiscated goods.
Slave merchants, both male and female, who are convicted under the
provisions of the law are to receive 50 lasnes. Magistrates who fail to act
in accordance with the provisions of the law are to be brought before
the council, which is to remove a convicted magistrate from his post and
fine him up to 500 drachmas.
Then, in ll. 36ff. , the council is instructed to acquire another certifier
of the coinage who is to work at a set location in the Piraeus, the harbor
district, for the benefit of shipowners, merchants, and "all the others."
If a certifier cannot be found among the city's current stock of public
slaves, one is to be purchased. The overseers of the market are to see
to it that the certifier for the Piraeus takes his position at the location
specified and that the law is followed. Inscribed copies of the law are to
be set up at the separate locations where the two certifiers will regularly
work. The new certifier for the Piraeus will receive the same payment
as the certifier in the agora, whose payment will henceforth be taken from
the same source as those to the mint workers. The law then closes with
the standard provision for eliminating any earlier law that is in conflict
with this new one.
This fascinating document has aroused scholarly comment and
disagreement on a wide range of issues, such as the treatment of imita
tions of Athenian coins, the nature of the work of the dokimastes, inter
pretation of the law as a legal tender act, the identification of tralatitious
material from earlier legislation reiterated in ll. 3-36 of this text of 375/4,
and the economic and political circumstances surrounding its passage and
the passage of earlier legislation on the same topic.3 Controversy has
3 In addition to the items listed above (n. 2), see A. Giovannini, "Athenian Currency
in the Late Fifth and Early Fourth Century B.C.," GRBS 16 (1975), pp. 185-95; R. Bogaert,
"L'assai des monnaies dans l'antiquite," RBN 122 (1976), pp. 5-34; T. Fischer, SM 26
(1976), pp. 20-21 (commenting on Giovannini, GRBS 16 [1975]); H. Wankel, "Zur For-
mulierung von Strafbestimmungen in dem neuen attischen Miinzgesetz," ZPE1\ (1976),
pp. 149-51; J. Diebolt and H. Nicolet-Pierre, "Recherches sur le metal de tetradrachms
a types atheniens," SNR 56 (1977), pp. 79-91; L. Migeotte, "Sur une clause des contrats
d'emprunt d'Amorgos," AC 46 (1977), pp. 128-39; J. and L. Robert, Bulletin Epigraphique
1977, nos. 146 and 147; A. Giovannini, Rome et la circulation monetaire en Grece au He siecle
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even arisen over the appropriate English translation of the Greek term
dokimastes. I have employed "certifier of the coinage," which seems to
convey the sense of the Greek term with the least awkwardness in
English.4
Other significant issues arising from this text have not yet, to my
knowledge, been raised in the scholarly debate: the anomaly of the power
exercised by the certifiers of the coinage at Athens and the question of
why they were public slaves. The significance of these issues will emerge
from a discussion of the appearance of imitations of Athenian coins in
circulation at Athens, the disruption of the established pattern of monetary
circulation at Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War, and the
characteristics of the Athenian institution of public slavery.
Numismatists have long recognized that silver coins imitating the types
of Athenian silver coinage were minted outside Attica, especially in the
avant Jesus-Christ (Basel, 1978), pp. 39, 68; T. V. Buttrey, "The Athenian Currency Law
of 375/4 B.C.," in Greek Numismatics and Archaeology. Essays in Honor of Margaret Thompson,
O. Merkholm and N. Waggoner, eds. (Wetteren, 1979), pp. 33-45; D. Placido, "La ley
aticade 375/4 a. C. y la politica ateniense," Memorias de Histmia Antigua 4 (1980), pp. 27-41;
J. and L. Robert, Bulletin Epigraphique 1980, nos. 195 and 196; T. V. Buttrey, "More on
the Athenian Coinage Law of 375/4 B.C.," NumAntClas 10 (1981), pp. 71-94; J. Cargill,
The Second Athenian League (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981), pp. 140-41 ; M. H. Hansen,
"Initiative and Decision: The Separation of Powers in Fourth-Century Athens," GRBS
22 (1981), p. 356; T. V. Buttrey, "Pharaonic Imitations of Athenian Tetradrachms," Pro
ceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Numismatics. Berne, September, 1979, T. Hackens
and R. Weiller, eds. (Louvain-la-Neuve/Luxembourg, 1982), pp. 137-40; E. Ercolani Cocchi,
"II controllo statale sulla circolazione di moneta straniera nelle citta greche," Rivista storica
dell'antichita 12 (1982), pp. 53-59; O. Merkholm, "Some Reflections on the Production
and Use of Coinage in Ancient Greece," Historia 31 (1982), pp. 290-96; S. Alessandri,
"II significato storico della legge di Nicofonte sul dokimastes monetario," AnnaliSNSPisa
14 (1984), pp. 369-93; T. V. Buttrey, "Seldom What They Seem— The Case of the Athe
nian Tetradrachm," Ancient Coins of the Greco-Roman World. The Nickle Numismatic Papers
(Waterloo, Canada, 1984), pp. 292-94; J. K. Davies, in The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd
ed., vol. 7, pt. 1 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 281; T. Eide, "Merisai and Dounai in Athenian
Fourth-Century Decrees," Symbolae Osloenses 59 (1984), pp. 21-28; O. Picard, "Sur deux
termes des inscriptions de la tresorerie d' A'i Khanoum, ' ' Hommages a Lucien Lerat 2 (Besan-
con, 1984), pp. 679-690; D. Bellinger, "Wahrungsordnung im griechischen Altertum: das
Miinzgesetz Athens," Die Bank 12 (1986), pp. 644-50; M. R. Cataudella, "Aspetti della
politica monetaria ateniese fra V e IV secolo," Sileno 12 (1986), pp. 111-35; G. Le Rider,
"A propos d'un passage des Poroi de Xenophon: la question du change et les monnaies
incuses d'ltalie du Sud, " in Kraay-Morkholm Essays. Numismatic Studies in Memory of C. M.
Kraay and 0. Morkholm, G. Le Rider et al, eds. (Louvain-la-Neuve/Luxembourg, 1989),
pp. 159-72.
4 Correspondingly, I will use "certification" as the translation for the work done by the
dokimastes, that is, the dokimasia of coinage. On the question of the translation of dokimastes,
see Buttrey in Greek Numismatics and Archaeology (above, n. 3), p. 38. I am grateful to Dr.
Buttrey for his illuminating correspondence on Athenian imitations and the law of 375/4.
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Near East and above all in Egypt. The style and the legends of these
imitations, to say nothing of their proveniences, clearly revealed their
non-Athenian origins to the eyes of trained observers.5 T.V. Buttrey has
now suggested, however, that huge numbers of imitations were also
minted in Egypt whose style so closely resembled that of official products
of the Athenian mint that modern scholars and collectors have long
mistaken them for authentic Athenian coins (see Plate 9, 5 for an exam
ple of one such coin identified by Buttrey). These nearly indistinguishable
imitations apparently began to be minted in the late fifth century, and
their production continued well into the fourth century. Buttrey has re
ferred to these coins as being so numerous as to constitute an Egyptian
national coinage in this period. Since they have been found as far west
as Sicily, they presumably made their way into monetary circulation
throughout the Greek world, including Athens.6
It is important in this context to emphasize that imitations, whether
easily distinguishable by their style and legends from authentic specimens
produced by the Athenian mint or not, are not counterfeits in the sense
that subaerate specimens are. As the text of the inscription shows, Athe
nian law recognized a difference by according imitations different legal
treatment at the hands of the certifier from that mandated for counterfeits.
Imitations differ from counterfeits because they are made of silver and
are not meant to cheat or deceive by disguising a core of base metal to
5 On the general phenomenon of imitations of Athenian coins, see C. M. Kraay, Archaic
and Classical Greek Coins (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976), pp. 73-74, 76-77; cf. G. K. Jenkins,
"Greek Goins Recently Acquired by the British Museum," NC 1955, pp. 144-50; M. Price,
"New Owls for the Pharaoh," Minerva 1 (1990), pp. 39-40. G. Stumpf./AfG 36 (above,
n. 2), p. 30, refers to a forthcoming publication in the series Xenia by Peter Franke on Per
sian satrapal imitations of Athenian owls in 415-405 B.C. (non vidi). The phenomenon
of imitations of course extended well beyond classical Athens. See, for example, J. -B. Giard,
"Les jeux de l'imitation: fraude ou necessite?," NumAntClas 14 (1985), pp. 231-38, for
the suggestion that Rome tolerated the production of imitations (mainly in bronze) in the
western provinces during times of "genuine necessity," notably wartime, and specifically
during the reign of Claudius. Goldsmiths in fourteenth-century Venice apparently minted
imitations of the coins of foreign states on a large scale until the practice was forbidden
in 1354. See F. C. Lane and R. C. Mueller, Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance
Venice, vol. 1, Coins and Moneys of Account (Baltimore, 1985), p. 158. (I owe this reference
to Alan Stahl.)
6 Buttrey, Proceedings (above, n. 3), pp. 137-40 and Ancient Coins of the Greco-Roman World
(above, n. 3), pp. 292-94. John H. Kroll has kindly informed me that, among the small
number of silver coins that have been found in the excavations of the Athenian Agora,
there are a few possible imitations, which may or may not be genuine Athenian coins. I
am grateful to Professor Kroll for sharing with me information from his forthcoming work
on the coin finds of the Agora Excavations and for his helpful advice on the subject of im
itations and counterfeits.
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appear as precious metal. The provision that imitations are to be return
ed to their owners recognizes the value such coins represented, if only
as bullion. Even if minted in good faith by a non-Athenian mint, however,
imitations could represent less value than authentic Athenian coins of
the same denomination since their silver might not be as pure as that
of products of the Athenian mint.7 Moreover, even imitations of good
style, once successfully identified as non-Athenian coins, presumably could
not command the same value in commercial exchange as the interna
tionally recognized coinage of Athens.8 In any case, from our
Athenocentric perspective, such silver coins are called imitations to dif
ferentiate them from base-metal frauds meant to deceive, that is, to
distinguish them from genuine counterfeits, to coin an oxymoron.9
In his publication of the law, Stroud restored a damaged portion of
the text (l. 9) to say that the certifier was to return a foreign imitation
to its owner "if it is good," that is, if it was minted from silver. He fur
ther concluded that "good" imitations were thereby certified for man
datory acceptance in circulation, just as authentic Athenian silver coins
certainly were. Some scholars have agreed with Stroud that the text means
that the certifiers of coinage certified imitations in the same way as authen
tic Athenian coins and that such coins after certification had to be ac
cepted as legally valid payment under penalty of law; others have rejected
this conclusion on historical and on epigraphical grounds.10 Personal in-
7 Buttrey, Proceedings (above, n. 3), p. 139, reported that the weight of the Egyptian imi
tations was good and that specific gravity analysis of a few selected examples revealed a
fineness of 95 to 99 % . The regular fineness of authentic Athenian silver coins apparently
registered toward the upper end of this range and above. See Diebolt and Nicolet-Pierre,
SNR 56 (above, n. 3), pp. 79-91, Buttrey, NumAnt Clas 10 (above, n. 3), p. 82, and Le
Rider, Kraay-Mtrkholm Essays (above, n. 3), p. 162. The analysis by Diebolt and Nicolet-
Pierre of a small sample of imitations and authentic Athenian coins suggests that even im
itations whose style very closely copied that of authenic Athenian coins had a fineness
somewhat less than that of authenic Athenian coins and that imitations of rougher style
tended to exhibit a lower level of fineness still, but the results of their scientific tests were
less clear for fifth-century than for later fourth-century specimens. The Greeks perhaps usually
worried litde about the fineness of coinages that were familiar. See Le Rider in Kraay-Mtrkholm
Essays (above, n. 3), p. 162. Coinages of uncertain pedigree, like imitations, probably created
considerably more disquiet on this topic for those who were asked to accept them as payment.
8 On the difference between the intrinsic, the nominal, and the commercial value of
coinages and the high valuation of Athenian coinage in the last category, see Le Rider in
Kraay-Mtrkholm Essays (above, n. 3), pp. 161-67.
On the phenomenon of ancient counterfeiting in general, see J. Graf, "Miinzver-
falschungen im Altertum," NZ 35 (1903), pp. 1-130; P. Grierson, Numismatics (Oxford,
1975), pp. 158-61.
10 For those agreeing with Stroud on this issue, see the references above, notes 2 and 3,
to J. and L. Robert (1977) and (1980), Cargill (1981), and Engelmann (1985). For those
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spection of the stone some years ago in Athens convinced me that the
restoration "if it is good" is epigraphically unsound." My own conclu
sion is that the law simply instructed the certifier to return to their owners
all imitations minted from silver, without specifying anything about their
being "good". Imitations not of silver, that is, plated coins or coins made
from detectably fraudulent alloys, would of course count as counterfeits
and be confiscated. In this way, the financial interests of the owners of
imitations minted from silver were protected, as they would not be if such
imitations were confiscated as equivalent to counterfeits. Imitations were
neither certified for mandatory acceptance nor barred from circulation.
The decision whether to accept them or not in financial and commercial
transactions and what value to place upon them was left to the judgment
of the individuals concerned, as with other foreign coinages or bullion.
"Genuine counterfeits" would be confiscated regardless of their place
of origin, which of course would be indeterminable anyway.
It is impossible to speculate with confidence about the relative impor
tance of imitations in creating the historical and monetary circumstances
at Athens that led to the laying down of the instructions to the certifier
of the coinage as preserved in the opening section of this text. Difficulties
arise not only because the text, in the fashion of much Athenian legisla
tion outside honorary decrees, offers no direct statement of the reasons
for its existence. The Athenian lawmakers knew why they had passed
these provisions and therefore felt no need to pad the text with what they
all already knew. Equally troubling is uncertainty about the date at which
the instructions for the certifier, including the provision for returning im
itations, were originally laid down. This uncertainty stems from the re
cent argument identifying as tralatitious all the provisions of the law of
in disagreement, see Giovannini (1975), Bogaert (1976), Diebolt and Nicolet-Pierre (1977),
Migeotte (1977), Buttrey (1979) and (1981), Bourriot (1983), Wankel (1983), Alessandri
(1984), Davies (1984), Bellinger (1986), Cautadello (1986), Stumpf (1986), and Le Rider
(1989). Sokolowski (1976) suggests certain imitations were made legal tender at Athens by
international agreements, while Fischer (1981) says imitations had the same status de facto
as Athenian coins.
For alternate restorations of the end of 1. 9 that yield quite different senses having nothing
to do with the "goodness" of imitations, see the references above, note 2, to Sokolowksi
(1976), Bourriot (1983), Martin (1983), Wankel (1983), and Engelmann (1985). Robert
Kallet-Marx has kindly informed me per litteras of his unpublished suggestion of e\pikop-
sas] (aorist participle of epikopio).
11 The paper that I delivered at the International Epigraphic Congress in Athens in 1981
in which I argued for this restoration has unfortunately been stalled indefinitely in the press
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Nicophon in ll. 3-36, which precede the provisions for purchasing a se
cond certifer to work in the Piraeus.12 The purchase of this new certifier
for the harbor district and the attendant financial arrangements would
then be the only new provisions passed in 375/4. If this identification
is correct, the instructions to the certifier on certifying coinage occur in
the part of the text that was passed down from an earlier law, and their
date must lie at some unspecified time in the period before the passage
of Nicophon's law in 375/4. The resultant uncertainty about the date
of the instructions on certification complements the uncertainty that
prevails over the date at which Egpytian imitations of good style began
to be minted in large numbers and presumably to make their way to
Athens.13
Whatever the larger historical circumstances may have been, the for
mulation of instructions for the certifier of the coinage was at the im
mediate level a response to the refusal of merchants at Athens to accept
genuine Athenian coinage, or to the fear that they would do so. The text
does not reveal whether anyone had so far actually refused coins that had
been certified by the certifier as authentic Athenian issues, as opposed
simply to refusing coins that had not been certified, but the provision
for punishment for anyone who does refuse duly certified coins shows
that such a situation was envisioned as a possibility. Since the refusal
of merchants to accept Athenian coins would obviously have had an
adverse affect on commerce and other financial transactions at Athens,
the provisions of the law were certainly designed to facilitate the smooth
operation of these sorts of activities, a necessary condition for the well-
being of the city in general. Unfortunately we lack any means to measure
just how significant the presence of imitations in the monetary circula
tion at Athens, or the suspicion that they were present, may have been
in making merchants reluctant to accept Athenian coins.
That reluctance can hardly have been unrelated to the unpredecented
and unsetding changes in the character of monetary circulation at Athens
that transpired between the closing years of the Peloponnesian War and
the passage of the law of Nicophon in 375/4. Athenians in the fifth cen-
12 See Alessandri, AnnaliSNSPisa 14 (above, n. 3) who dates the earlier legislation to
402-399, regarding it as a response to the confused monetary situation at Athens following
the Peloponnesian War. Stumpf.yM? 36 (above, n. 2), pp. 23-40, dates the original law
to 378/7 B.C. in connection with the foundation of the Second Athenian League.
13 On this latter uncertainty, see the brief Addendum to Buttrey's paper in Ancient Coins
of the Greco-Roman World (above, n. 3), p. 294.
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tury had been accustomed to a comforting and reliable sameness in their
silver coinage. The exigencies of fighting a prolonged war against Spar
ta and its allies, however, eventually disrupted the stable conditions of
monetary circulation at Athens. So strapped for money to pay war ex
penses did Athens become in the last decade of the fifth century that in
406/5 the city took the drastic step of recalling its pure silver coinage from
internal circulation and replacing it with bronze coins thinly plated with
silver (Plate 9, 6).
14 A gold coinage (Plate 9, 7) had been initiated in the
previous year to help meet the financial emergency in making external
payments.15 When the Athenian treasury was once again sound enough
to reintroduce genuine silver coins into domestic circulation, the official
subaerate issues were demonetized and recalled. The date was sometime
before the production of the Assemblywomen of Aristophanes in ca. 393-391,
in which ll. 815-822 allude to this event.
The reintroduction of Athenian silver coinage into domestic circula
tion probably depended, initially at least, largely on the reuse of older
coins. Even after the mint had resumed the actual minting of new coins
once again, the volume of its production of silver coins appears to have
been significantly reduced during the early decades of the fourth cen
tury, as compared to its robust output in the fifth century.16 A relative
scarcity of Athenian silver coinage in the early fourth century may have
helped to create a demand for silver coins to which an influx into Athe
nian circulation of Egyptian imitations minted from good silver could
have been a response. Foreign imitations thus probably contributed to
the uncertainty about Athenian coinage that arose from the emergency
coinages minted as a result of the pressures of war.
A period of low mint production would also have represented an op
portunity for counterfeiters, who could hope that difficulties in acquir
ing coinage to use would make the public more willing to take whatever
14 J.H. Kroll, "Aristophanes' ponera chalkia: A Reply," GRBS 17 (1976), pp. 329-41.
Athens did not begin to mint a regular bronze coinage until the mid-fourth century. See
Kroll, "A Chronology of Early Athenian Bronze Coinage, ca. 350-250 B.C.," in Greek
Numismatics and Archaeology. Essays in Honor ofMargaret Thompson, O. Merkholm and N. Wag
goner, eds. (Wetteren, 1979), pp. 139-54. The bronze coin dated to before 393 B.C. by
E. Paszthory, "Zu den friihen Bronzemunzen in Athen," SM 30 (1980), pp. 1-3, is a fake.
See J.H. Kroll, "A Spurious Athenian Bronze Coin," SM 32 (1982), pp. 59-60.
15 E.S.G. Robinson, "Some Problems in the Later Fifth Century Coinage of Athens,"
ANSMN9 (1960), pp. 1-15; W.E. Thompson, "The Functions of the Emergency Coinages
of the Peloponnesian War," Mnemosyne 19 (1966), pp. 337-43.
16 See Stroud (above, n. 1), p. 171 with n. 45.
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coins they could get than they would have been in less pressured cir
cumstances. In any case, counterfeit coins were always something to worry
about in antiquity, like the plated tetradrachms from a hoard of 350-325
that was buried in the Athenian agora (Plate 9, 8)."
All these conditions made the certifiers of the coinage invaluable,
especially in the disturbed conditions of monetary circulation at Athens
that had begun in the last years of the Peloponnesian War. The city-state's
certifiers provided both a public and a private service: for the state, they
certified the coinage that was being used to make payments to it
,
such
as taxes and fines; for private individuals, they certified coins for use in
commercial and financial transactions with other individuals. Private
bankers and money-changers at Athens, as elsewhere, presumably had
always exercised a kind of de facto certification of coinage as part of their
normal business practice, either examining coins themselves or hiring
their own certifier.18 But the law of 375/4 is , as Stroud points out, the
earliest direct attestation for the certifier of the coinage as a public func
tionary, whose decisions carried the force of law.19 The provisions of the
inscription of course show that the post had been established at some
earlier, unspecified date.20 Stroud suggests that a public certifier was
already in place by 398/7, when the first reference occurs in the
Hekatompedon accounts to "the counterfeit staters sealed in a box from
Lakon."21
The certification of the city's coinage had presumably always been a
necessary and important function at Athens, as in any ancient state,
because the value of ancient currency was directly related to its intrinsic
value as precious metal. Recognized coinages of course earned a premium
A.S. Walker, "Some Plated Coins from the Agora at Athens," in Proceedings of the Ninth
International Congress ofNumismatics. Berne, September, 1979, T. Hackens and R. Weiller, eds.
(Louvain-la-Neuve/Luxembourg, 1982), pp. 131-36. He has kindly informed me that he
no longer regards these coins as official issues but rather as the products of a counterfeiter.
J.H. Kroll in his forthcoming publication on the coins found in the Athenian Agora remarks
on the high percentage of counterfeits among the relatively scarce finds of silver coins there.
18 For Athens, see Menander, frag. 581 (Korte). For dokimastai in private transactions
elsewhere, see J. Hangard, Monetaire en Daarmee Verwante Metaforen (Groningen, 1963), pp.
26-27; R. Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les citesgrecques(Leiden, 1968), pp. 44-47, 238, 318.
19 Stroud (above, n. 1), p. 165. U. Kohler, "Attische Schatzurkunde aus dem Ende des
vierten Jahrhunderts," AM 5 (1880), p. 279, had suggested on indirect evidence that Athens
had a dokimastes who was a public slave.
20 Stroud (above, n. 1), p. 166.
21 Stroud, pp. 176-77. See also S. Alessandri, "Gli stateri falsi para Lakonos," An-
naliSNSPisa 12 (1982), pp. 1239-1254.
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in exchange over bullion, but the value of coins as units of exchange still
arose primarily from their intrinsic value.22 When a citizen paid his
taxes or a fine to the city, the city needed to be certain that he was paying
with valuable currency, that is, in silver coins minted by the Athenian
mint, and not with counterfeit coins. The same need applied to com
mercial transactions. My guess is that Athens had had a need for cer
tification of coinage from practically the moment that the city began to
accept payments in coin, and I would be surprised if no arrangements
for certification had been made earlier in the fifth century, when enor
mous quantities of coinage were flowing into and out of the state treasury
during the height of the Athenian Empire.23
The importance of the task performed by the public certifiers of the
coinage is given further emphasis by the care with which the law specifies
their duties: they must certify Athenian coinage according to the provi
sions of the law; they must be present at specified locations, they must
return all imitations to their owners, and they must mark and confiscate
all counterfeits.24 These provisions are clearly intended to serve and pro
tect the financial interests of the state and of the public. The instruction
that the certifier is to return all imitations is especially relevant with regard
to the interests of individuals. Imagine, for example, the situation that
the certifier would have faced when someone presented him with an imi
tation Athenian coin, if Athenian law had only taken into account two
categories of Athenian coinage, authentic and counterfeit. Since the imi
tation was not an official issue of the Athenian mint, it could not have
been certified as authentic for mandatory acceptance in financial
payments. But if the coin did not belong to this category, the only category
left for it would have been that of counterfeits. To do his job according
to instructions and therefore protect himself from punishment, the cer
tifier would have been compelled to confiscate the imitation, thereby of
course depriving its owner of the value of the confiscated property. Under
2 The premium was usually 5% or more. See Merkholm, Historic 31 (above, n. 3), pp.
290-96, and Le Rider in Kraay-M$rkholm Essays (above, n. 3), pp. 164-65.
23 Those arrangements, I suppose, could have been ad hoc rather than permanent. That
is, to envision one possibility, the state could have from time to time contracted for a period
of service from a certifier who normally was employed in the private sphere by a banker
or money changer.
24 The Athenians and others who made use of the certifiers' services obviously had to
place a great deal of trust in these slaves. See Y. Garlan, L 'esclavagedans le monde grec. Recueil
de textts grecs et latins. Centres de Recherches d'Histoire Ancienne, vol. 60, Annales Litteraires de
l'Universite de Besancon, 305 (Paris, 1984), no. 26, pp. 56-59.
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these conditions, a dishonest certifier could even have confiscated imita
tions on the grounds that they were indeed counterfeit, as they were by
definition not authentic, and then pocketed them for later disposal as
bullion for his private gain in the knowledge that they were in fact made
of silver. The provision that imitations minted from silver must be
returned, and, as I believe, returned unconditionally, prevented any
abuses of this sort and thereby protected the financial interests of those
who might unknowingly present imitations to the certifier.
It might be objected that Athenian lawmakers would have been unlikely
to bother themselves with laying down regulations to control the behavior
of slaves, as the certifiers were, because slaves could simply be punished
whenever they failed to perform satisfactorily. This objection might have
force if it were applied to the relations between a slave owner and a private
ly held slave working under close supervision. A master who observed
his slave misbehaving could simply correct and punish him forthwith.
Different conditions obtained, however, in the case of public slaves, who
often worked without direct and constant supervision.25 As an inscrib
ed Athenian law of the late second century makes clear, for example,
public slaves had the opportunity to engage in just the sort of financial
impropriety concerning citizens who used their services as that envision
ed above for a dishonest certifier handling imitations.26 One of this in
scription's provisions, unfortunately damaged so that its full text is
unavailable, is well enough preserved to show that the public slaves placed
in charge of the standards for official weights and measures were to be
punished "if they charge anyone money ,.."27 In other words, the
25 On Athenian public slaves, see S. Waszynski, De servis Athmiensium publicis (diss. Berlin,
1898); O. Silverio, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des attischen Staatssklaven (diss. Munich, 1900);
G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1926), pp. 979-81; O.
Jacob, Les esclaves publics a Athenes (Liege and Paris, 1928; repr. New York, 1979); A.M.
Andreades, A History of Greek Public Finance, vol. 1, rev. ed., Carroll Brown, trans. (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1933), pp. 250-51; W. L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman
Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1955), pp. 9-10; V. Ehrenberg, The People ofAristophanes (New York,
1962), pp. 173-75; N. Brockmeyer, Antike Sklaverei (Darmstadt, 1979), p. 109; T.E.J.
Wiedemann, Greek and Roman Slavery (Baltimore, 1981), chap. 8; Wiedemann, Slavery. Greece
& Rome New Surveys in the Classics, no. 19 (Oxford, 1987), chap. 5; and Y. Garlan, Slavery
in Ancient Greece, rev. ed., Janet Lloyd, trans. (Ithaca, NY, 1988), pp. 68-69.
26 IG ii2 1013, with Hesperia 7 (1938), p. 127, no. 27. On the political and economic con
texts of this decree, see L. Breglia Pulci Doria, "Per la storia di Atene alia fine del II sec.
a. C. U decreto sui pesi e misure: IG ii2 1013, Melanges de L'Ecole francaise de Rome. Anti-
quite 97 (1985), pp. 411-30. The text is translated in M.M. Austin, The Hellenistic World
from Alexander to the Roman Conquest (Cambridge, 1981), no. 111.
27 L. 44.
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possibility was envisioned that these public slaves might try to cheat people
by charging them for a service that was supposed to be free or that they
might accept bribes from crooked merchants who wanted to use short
measures.
The frequent lack of supervision was only one of the characteristics
of public slavery at Athens.28 A public slave belonged not to any single
individual or family but to the city-state as a whole. The Athenian term
for public slave, demosios, expressed this relationship clearly— the slave
was the property of the demos, of the people, just as were the ballots in
the courts or the dinnerware in the city's official dining hall, which were
inscribed with the same adjective.29 To paraphrase Aristotle, public
slaves were the living tools of the polis.30 Such slaves were acquired as
captives in war, from confiscated private property that had been taken
away from Athenians as a penalty for conviction of a serious crime against
the state, and by purchase from the international traffic in slaves.31 The
law of Nicophon illustrates this last alternative, as it mandates the pur
chase of an additional public slave to serve as the certifier of coinage in
the Piraeus, if one cannot be found among the current stock of public
slaves. Purchase was probably the most common method of acquiring
public slaves, especially if their competence to do a particular job was
at issue, as in the case of the certification of coinage. Buying a slave on
the market gave the purchaser the opportunity to inspect the prospective
purchase and find out if he possessed the skills needed to do the job for
which he was being purchased.32
This consideration would have been especially important in selecting
a slave to work as an official certifier of the coinage because that post
called for highly specialized skills. First of all, the slave had to speak Greek
in order to deal with those who presented coins to him. Even more im
portantly, he had to be believed to possess sufficient technical skill in
scrutinizing coinage to inspire confidence in the reliability of his judgments
Privately owned slaves in the category known as "those who live outside the household"
(choris oikountes) seem also to have operated without much direct supervision, such as the
slave merchants mentioned in the text of the law of Nicophon. On this category of slaves,
see Garlan, Slavery (above, n. 25), pp. 70-71.
29 For illustrations of these artifacts, see J. Camp, The Athenian Agora (London, 1986),
p. 95, pi. 70, and p. 108, pi. 80.
30 Pol. 1, 1253b32.
31 Jacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), p. 9.
32 Jacob, Les esclaues, p. 11.
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concerning which coins were authentic Athenian coins, which were imi
tations, and which were counterfeits.33
We have no direct evidence of the methods that the Athenian certifiers
relied on to do their job. Perhaps they used some of the tests mentioned
by Epictetus in his comparison of the philosopher's need to test proposi
tions with the techniques followed in the certification of coinage at the
time of the early Roman Empire.34 The certifier, he remarked, employs
sight, touch, smell, and, finally, sound, by listening to the noise the coin
(in this case a silver denarius) makes when repeatedly thrown down,
presumably against a hard surface.35 The absence of any mention here
of a touchstone is probably to be explained by the inaccuracy of this
method in testing silver coinage, as opposed to gold coins.36 A certifier
could also have used a scale to verify the weights of coins, but we hear
nothing of this technique in official use at Athens.37 Aristophanes refers
to sound being used as a criterion for good quality.38
The special group of slaves to which the certifiers belonged, that of
public slaves, performed a broad range of both skilled and unskilled tasks
33 Petronius has Trimalchio remark on the difficulty of the job of a certifier (nummularius
in Latin) — like a doctor, he has to divine what is invisible on the inside from what is visible
on the outside (Satyricon 56). As we shall see later, all that could realistically have been achieved
was for people to believe that the slave who was to serve as an official Athenian dokimastes
had the ability to determine the status of different kinds of coins whose appearances were
extraordinarily similar, namely, authentic products of the Athenian mint and high-quality
imitations such as those Buttrey has identified as coming from Egypt. Belief, not proof,
was all that could be achieved because no empirically decisive tests existed to tell the coins
apart.
34 Arr. Epict. Diss. 1.20.7-9.
35 Epictetus uses the term argyronomon to refer to a certifier. See Pollux, Onomasticon 3.84
for a list of such terms. For the use of the sense of smell as a test, see the case of the renown
ed antiquary Friedlander, who is reported to have sniffed coins as a check on their quality
(RE 17, s.v. "nummularius," cols. 1418-19 [Herzog]).
36 On the touchstone and other methods of testing coins, see Bogaert, RBN 122 (above,
n. 3), pp. 5-34 and G.C. Boon, in Coins and the Archaeologist, 2nd. ed., John Casey and
Richard Reece, eds. (London, 1988), p. 148, notes 19-20. Naturally, a certifier did not
use cupellation to test silver coins, unless they were going to be melted down anyway for
reminting or bullion. For example, Livy 32.2 records that Roman quaestors employed
cupellation to confirm their suspicion that the Carthaginians were paying their war indem
nities with a silver coinage of inferior fineness.
Aesch. Ag. 437-38, apparently the sole reference in classical Greek literature to the use
of a balance scale for weighing precious metal, does not refer to the weighing of coins, ac
cording to Picard, in Hommages. . . Lerat (above, n. 3), pp. 685-86. Nor do we hear anything
about magnets, which could have been used to detect coins with an iron core. And, of course,
Archimedes's test of specific gravity had not yet been invented in 375/4.
38
Frogs, ll. 721-24.
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in and for the city-state of Athens. Oscar Jacob, in his monograph
published in 1928 that remains a standard survey on Athenian public
slaves,39 drew a broad distinction between two kinds of public slaves
distinguished by their functions: those who were workers or laborers (les
esclaves publics-ouvriers) and those who were attendants or servants (les
esclaves publics-employes).110 His distinction, then, was between those
public slaves who performed manual labor and those whose duties were,
to use modern terminology, more white-collar in nature. Many public
slaves in both these categories performed tasks that carried great respon
sibilities and had direct effects on the lives of citizens. Nevertheless, as
we shall see, all of them except for the certifiers had one limit in com
mon regardless of how important or unsupervised their jobs were: they
had no power to make decisions on their own affecting the lives and pro
perty of others.
The public slaves who were workers and laborers had more physically
strenuous and generally less attractive jobs than than did the attendants
and servants.41 Public slaves, for example, had the onerous job of main
taining the maze of streets and alleys of the city in good repair and keep
ing them clear of debris.42 The citizen officials called astynomoi had public
slaves at their disposal to remove and bury the corpses of persons who
had died in the streets and whose families were presumably too destitute
to give them proper burial.43 Public slaves probably formed the core of
the work force in the state mint of classical Athens.44 A complement of
public slaves also performed manual labor as a maintenance crew attached
to the sanctuary of the Mysteries of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis.45
39 See above, n. 25.
40 Jacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), pp. 4-5. See below on the Scythian archers, whom
he placed in an intermediate category of their own.
41 Jacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), pp. 13-52. The dirtiest job in Athens, that of the
manure gatherers who collected dung and filth from the streets and dumped it outside the
city walls, was probably performed not by public slaves, but rather by hired workers. See
Jacob, Les esclaves, pp. 13-19.
42 Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 54.1.
43 Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 50.2. Jacob, Les esclaves(above, n. 25), pp. 17-18, thinks these slaves
had a more elevated job than the ordinary worker public slaves, and Aristotle does call
them "servants"(Aji/wreto) rather than "workers." Nevertheless, the exigencies of their job
surely placed them in the ranks of the workers, at least from a modern perspective.
44 Andocides frg. 5 (schol. At. Wasps 1007).
45 Public slaves are attested as having been entertained at the public expense with meat
and wine at the Choes festival at Eleusis. Two of them were even initiated into the Mysteries.
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Other public slaves had official responsibilities that potentially invol
ved danger because they required the use of force against persons. At
Athens, a board of citizen magistrates called The Eleven were in charge
of arrests, imprisonments, and executions. The Eleven were served by
a contingent of public slaves who, on the orders of The Eleven, did the
actual hands-on dirty work of seizing condemned persons or their pro
perty.46 These slaves served as prison warders, as the public executioner,
and as the official torturers who were called upon to exact testimony under
duress from slaves and unprotected foreigners who became embroiled
in legal cases. Employing slaves for these confrontational and sometimes
violent duties made sense in several ways. Since the slaves could stay
in their posts for years, while citizen magistrates rotated in and out an
nually, the slaves over time could develop the necessary hard shell that
the constantly changing citizen officials might lack. More importantly,
this employment of public slaves allowed citizens to maintain an arm's
length separation from the application of force or violence to fellow
citizens, especially when the task incurred a risk of ritual pollution, as
in the case of putting a fellow citizen to death.
The same consideration explains the make-up of the only police force
that Athens ever had. For about 75 to 100 years, the Athenians had as
their policemen a cadre of public slaves who were bowmen from
Scythia.47 The existence in the heart of the city of hundreds of armed
slaves must rank as one of the most striking anomalies in Athenian soical
history. These barbarian archers primarily served as guards against
riotous or violent behavior by citizens on public occasions such as meetings
of the assembly. The citizen magistrates in charge of such occasions would
See IG ii2 1672, ll. 204, 207 (329/8 B.C.); cf. Ps.-Dem. 59.21. These two were initiated
because there were needed to work inside the sanctuary, but no uninitiated person was
allowed inside the godessess's compound. Therefore, these public slaves gained initiation
not through any dispensation that was concerned with their fate as individuals but rather
as a necessity so that their labor could be available to the administration of the cult. See
Jacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), pp. 40-43.
46 Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 52.1. See Jacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), pp. 79-87 and P.J.
Rhodes, A Commentary on theAristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981), p. 580. Jacob ranks
these slaves among the attendant or servant category, but I see the nature of their duties
as aligned with those in the worker category.
47 Seejacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), pp. 53-78; V. Ehrenberg, The People ofAristophanes
(New York, 1962), p. 175; M.F. Jongkee-Vos, Scythian Archers in Archaic Attic Vase-Painting
(Groningen, 1963); K.-W. Welwei, Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst. Ersten Teil: Athen und Sparta
(Wiesbaden, 1974, Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei V), pp. 8-22, 50-54; and H.
Strasburger, Zum antiken Gesellschajtsideal (Heibelberg, 1976), pp. 61-62.
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direct the Scythian archers to remove any disruptive participants. But
these slave policemen never took action on their own; as living tools, they
merely followed the instructions of citizen magistrates. The Athenians
apparently dissolved the force early in the fourth century as a cost-cutting
measure.
The white-collar category of public slaves covered a wide range of im
portant duties and competencies.48 The jobs of public slaves in this
category in general demanded more education than did those of the
workers or police. For instance, many such slaves needed the ability to
read and write. In fact, the rate of literacy of attendant or servant public
slaves probably exceeded that of the general population of Attica by a
wide margin.49 As an ancient commentator said with reference to a
mention of a public slave in Demosthenes, "the Athenian demos makes
a practice of buying slaves who know their letters."50
Literate and numerate public slaves filled many important clerical posts
in Athenian public administration. A public slave, for example, was
assigned as a servant to the Athenian council and given custody of the
records of the financial obligations that were made by the city's contracts
board and then were cancelled after settlement by the board of
receivers.51 A public slave also had charge of the records kept in the
shrine of the Mother of the Gods, the Metroon.52 Presumably fulfilling
a similar function, a public slave is on record as having the responsibility
for writing down what was found in the Chalcotheke, a kind of municipal
warehouse on the Acropolis.53 A public slave served as an assistant to
the magistrates in charge of the city's naval arsenals, for which he helped
maintain inventories of equipment and verify complicated financial
Jacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), pp. 79-145. Jacob presumably regarded the dokimastes
of coinage as a member of the attendant or servant group of public slaves, since his only
mention of the dokimastes (p. 110, n. 1) comes in a note in the section on the public slaves
who guarded the weights and measures of the city-state, who definitely belong to the atten
dant class.
49 W.V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), p. 114, sets the range of
literacy for the entire population of Attica between 5% and 10%, a rate much lower than
that often assumed.
50 Schol. Dem. 2.19.
51 Ath. Pol. 47.5, 48.1. See P.J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford, 1972), pp. 141-43,
on the attendants of the council.
52 Demosthenes 19.129; IG ii2 463, U. 28-9; 583, U. 5-7.
53 IG ii2 120, U. 11-13.
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records.54 Public slaves served as financial assistants and accountants to
citizen officials on military expeditions and in other financial activities
for which record keeping was needed, such as the recording of the pay
ment of arrears in taxes and the recasting of sacred objects.55
Yvon Garlan in his study of ancient slavery offers an explanation of
the seeming paradox that the Athenians used public slaves "in responsi
ble administrative positions." The Athenian "principles of annual rota
tion of office-holders, and of the distribution of responsibility among
various members of a board of magistrates . . . made it difficult for essen
tial technical information to be transferred from one year's magistrates
to the next. Continuity had to be provided by subordinate ad
ministrators."56 Public slaves, who continued in their posts indefinite
ly, constituted these subordinates, who possessed a level of technical ex
pertise in their speciality that their notional superiors, the citizen
magistrates, would have been hard pressed to equal. Moreover, the public
slaves' lack of the kind of social and family ties that citizens had to one
another served as some control against corruption and favoritism. Not
being owned by any particular citizen and lacking normal social ties,
public slaves would not have obligations to particular citizens and could
thus be expected to be less susceptible to influence and social pressure
than citizen officials.
The hellenistic Athenian inscription previously mentioned concerning
weights and measures testifies to the level of trust that the city could place
in public slaves. It directs the citizen who was "appointed to [provide]
the measures and weights" to hand them over to public slaves, so that
the "measures and weights may remain for [future] time."57 That is
,
this legislation entrusts public slaves with the supervision of the official
Athenian standards for weights and measures that were kept on deposit
in several locations and whose use was compulsory on merchants and
tradespeople. In this latter sense, this legislation is analagous to the legal
provisions preserved in the law of Nicophon that mandate the acceptance
of the norms established by the Athenian assembly and specify
punishments for those who fail to conform. Citizens serving in the govern
ment had general responsibility for oversight of these slaves, but the slaves
54 IG ii2 1631, col. b, l. 197; col c, U. 381-82.
55 Demosthenes 8.47; 22.70; IG ii2 839, l. 42.
Slavery in Ancient Greece, rev. ed., Janet Lloyd, trans. (Ithaca, NY, 1988), pp. 41-42.
57 IG ii2 1013, ll. 38-40.
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apparently operated largely on their own.
Indeed, official supervision of public slaves other than the police and
the assistants of The Eleven could apparently be extremely loose. A.R.W.
Harrison, in his work on Greek law, has even called public slaves a
"privileged class" whose "legal status approximated closely to that of
metics."58 A section of an oration by Aeschines provides a revealing
glimpse of the relative freedom enjoyed by at least some public slaves
at Athens in the fourth century. According to Aeschines, the public slave
Pittalacus had lots of money to spend and a home of his own, no doubt
an apartment that he rented rather than owned. Pittalacus socialized with
citizens and ran a dicing and cock fighting emporium in his home that
citizens patronized.59 The story of Pittalacus implies that the status of
a public slave could appear at least superficially, in terms of everyday
living conditions, to be not much different from that of a free person of
low social status.60
Further evidence for the special status that public slaves enjoyed, at
least compared to that of most of their counterparts owned by private
citizens, is that they received regular payments for their support in return
for their labor. The amount that they received was no more than a living
wage at best, but they received it every day, it appears, a regularity that
58 The Law of Athens. The Family and Property (Oxford, 1968), p. 177.
59 After some citizens roughed him up, Pittalacus brought suit against his attackers, with
whom he had been embroiled in sexual and gambling matters and then had a falling out.
Aeschines, in his section on Pittalacus (1 .53-65), gives no indication that Pittalacus required
a patron to intervene on his behalf in court, a status not enjoyed by Athenian women and
children. Cf. Harrison, Law (above, n. 58), p. 177. Furthermore, the citizen Glaucon rescued
Pittalacus when Hegesandrus, one of the citizens with whom Pittalacus was at odds, claim
ed Pittalacus in fact belonged to him as his personal property and was not a public slave.
This claim was Hegesandrus's counterattack to Pittalacus's suit against him. It was an ef
fective tactic because Pittalacus dropped his suit, realizing, according to Aeschines, that
he could not be successful in a legal fight against men of higher status. The terminology
that Aeschines uses for Glaucon's rescue of Pittalacus {aphaeresis eis eleutherian) is the same
term used to describe the rescue of a free man who had been wrongly enslaved by another
individual. On this terminology, see Harrison, Law , pp. 178-80. He does not mention its
application to the case of Pittalacus. On Pittalacus, see also Douglas M. MacDowell, The
Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, NY, 1978), p. 83. Jacob, Les esclaves (above, n. 25), pp.
158-62, believes that the use of this term means that Pittalcus had been a public slave at
one point but had been subsequently manumitted.
60 Of course, the resemblance was genuinely superficial. The children of public slaves,
for example, were not entitled to citizenship, as shown by the case of Nicomachus (Lysias
30.2, 27-8). Employed as a transcriber for the nomothetai, he was alleged to have been the
son of a father who was a public slave. This accusation was designed to cast doubt on the
right of Nicomachus to the citizenship and to his post, in which he was accused of malfeasance.
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an ordinary free laborer could not enjoy.61 Private slaves certainly could
not automatically count on being granted the privilege of receiving an
allowance or wage. And public slaves could hope not just for regular
material rewards but also for the chance to win a certain level of esteem
in the eyes of free citizens. Demosthenes even implies that slaves in public
administration enjoyed a better reputation for trustworthiness and in
tegrity than did citizens.62 Some public slaves became well enough
known to be chosen by name for important posts by vote of the
citizens.63
The provisions for punishment in the text on weights and measures
also reveal that public slaves were too valuable simply to dismiss or ex
ecute if they failed to perform their duties satisfactorily. Like the cer
tifiers of the coinage, they could be whipped for misbehavior, but other
provisions included making them replace any items that they lost or
destroyed, and cutting off the payments for their work if they failed to
hand in a proper inventory of the items over which they had supervi
sion.64 In other words, various punishments were available according to
the offense. I take one of the significances of the existence of this range
of punishments to be that the Athenians found it more cost effective to
discipline public slaves in the hope of restoring them to duty rather than
to discard them like broken tools. The legislation on weights and measures
in fact reveals that public slaves as malefactors could be lumped together
with non-slaves: "If anyone is apprehended committing an offence con
cerning the measures and weights . . . , whether he is a magistrate or a
[private citizen] or a public slave, he will be punished according to the
law passed about [the punishment] of malefactors."65
In sum, then, public slaves, especially those in what I have called the
white-collar category, apparently enjoyed a degree of independence in
their personal lives and often occupied positions of considerable respon
sibility and status in the Athenian government. Nevertheless, regardless
of the amount of responsibility, expertise, knowledge, money, weapons,
or freedom from supervision that these public slaves possessed, none of
For public slaves receiving a daily allowance of three obols, see IG ii2 1672, U. 4-5
(329/8 B.C.). Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 49.4, reports that the disabled in this same period receiv
ed a daily subsistence grant of two obols a day, on which see P.J. Rhodes, (above, n. 46),
p. 570.
62 Demosthenes 22.71.
63 IG ii2 839, ll. 52-53.
64 IG ii2 1013, U. 49-54.
65 IG ii2 1013, ll. 58-62.
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them, with the striking and anomalous exception of the certifiers of the
coinage, made official decisions on their own that affected the lives or
property of Athenian citizens. They had no real power, in other words.
For instance, in the case of the public slaves who supervised the stan
dards of weights and measures, the legislation specifically states that "the
magistrates whose duty it is under the law shall make standard measures
corresponding to the copies that have been made ..."66 The public
slaves had only the mechanical, albeit important, duty of (to paraphrase
the text) preserving the standards and giving copies to the magistrates
and to all others who need them. The slaves are specifically enjoined from
altering the standards or removing them from the buildings in which they
are stored. So, too, the other white-collar public slaves who served as
scribes and clerks could be very knowledgeable about the information
under their management, but they made no decisions about what to in
clude or exclude or any other kind of decision affecting the citizens of
Athens. Nor did the slave assistants of The Eleven or the Scythian ar
chers of the police force act on their own. They made no decisions on
whom to drag off; they only acted on the orders of the presiding
magistrates.
The special significance of the certifiers of the coinage is therefore that,
unlike all other public slaves, they on their own made decisions in the
course of doing their jobs that directly affected the interests of citizens
and others at Athens —they decided which coins were certified and which
were not, which coins would circulate at full value with the sanction of
the law mandating their acceptance and which would not. This unique
ability as slaves to exercise power over the property of citizens (and non-
citizens as well) made the certifiers of the coinage anomalous in the Athe
nian system of administration.
The anomaly seems all the more striking because the power of the post
of certifier did not lend itself to the kind of precise and regular scrutiny
that was otherwise absolutely standard in Athenian public administra
tion. Elaborate processes of scrutiny not only of their credentials but also
of their performance in office awaited citizen magistrates before, dur
ing, and after their terms. Indeed, an audit was a formal requirement
if the official had performed any duties having to do with the finances
of Athens. Various kinds of law suits could also be brought against citizen
magistrates.67
66 IG ii2 1013, ll. 7-8.
67 See J.T. Roberts, Responsibility in Athenian Government (Madison, WI, 1982), for a full
discussion of the elaborate mechanisms of Athenian government for insuring the account-
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By contrast, the nature of the certifier's work meant that no reliable
mechanisms were available to assess the the exercise of his power in deter
mining the status of coins, except perhaps concerning the identification
of plated coins. Their base metal cores could be exposed by the simple
expedient of cutting into them to verify their interior contents. Just such
coins have been found in Athens (e.g. Plate 9, 4).
68 This physical test
was presumably not foolproof — the cut might not go deep enough or the
base metal core, if produced as a silvery-looking alloy, might have the
deceptive appearance of silver. Nevertheless, a cut did offer at least some
sort of physical evidence for the nature and the value of the coin in ques
tion. In the case of other, more sophisticated forgeries, however, no
comparable physical test existed to reveal their fraudulent nature. As
Buttrey has well pointed out, forgeries would have been physically
undetectable if they were of the proper weight, carried good copies of
the official Athenian types, and had been made from an alloy of base
metal and silver whose admixture of base metal was too low to be visible
and thus detectable by a cut but still high enough to insure a fat profit
for the counterfeiters.69
In all cases except those of plated coins, then, the certifier's personal
judgment about a coin had to decide the case. Since neither touchstones
nor any other available technology could provide physical evidence to
distinguish effectively between these kinds of counterfeits and authentic
Athenian coins, a certifier could do his job only by performing a scrutiny
of coins whose accuracy the other interested parties could not easily assess
or control. Perhaps the certifier did acquire some objective and helpful
evidence about the coins he was passing judgment on by sniffing the coins
brought to him or dropping them to hear their ring or scrutinizing their
style, but in truth he had to base his decision primarily on his overall
personal judgment, just as numismatists today must do unless, like
Buttrey, they have the opportunity to study die links in a large body of
material.70 If a certifier said a coin was not a genuine Athenian silver
ability of officials. The power of citizen officials was subject to control by dokimasia (scrutiny
of one's credentials before taking up office), apocheirotonia and eisangelia (forms of impeach
ment during the term of office), and euthynai (audit upon leaving office). Graphai could be
brought against them in the courts.
68 Stroud (above, n. 1), pp. 173-74.
69 NumAntClas 10 (above, n. 3), pp. 81-82.
70 G.C. Boon, in his essay on counterfeit coins in Roman Britain in Coins and the Ar
chaeologist (above, n. 36), p. 104, remarks that "the nummularius had neither the time nor
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issue, legally it was not, and no one could definitively prove him wrong.
And there was no effective appeal from the decision of a public certifier,
as opposed to that of one working for a private business. That is, if some
one took a coin to a private certifier in the employ of a banker or a money
changer and received a negative opinion on the status of a coin, it was
always possible to move on to the next table for a second and perhaps
different opinion. Not so with the public certifier.
Review of the certification of coinage would have become even more
problematic once it was realized that imitation Athenian coins made from
silver, as opposed to counterfeit, plated coins, had entered into the system
of monetary exchange at Athens. Cutting a gash in an imitation coin
did no good; its core was silver, just like that of a coin produced by the
Athenian mint: Plate 9, 9 shows an imitation that has been cut. Yet the
certifier's decision that coins were imitations meant significant financial
loss for their possessor. Such coins appear to have been discounted at
least five per cent in exchange, if anyone was willing to take them as pay
ment.71 Potentially more serious than this loss was the possibility of the
supposedly liquid capital that the coins represented being effectively frozen
if no one would accept them. In this way, the certifier certainly exercised
a power of decision that directly affected the financial interests of those
who used his service.
That the law specifically stated that a certifier was to perform his duty
according to its provisions reveals a concern for control over him. Never
theless it remained true that, because there was no truly indisputable test
to differentiate between authentic and imitation Athenian coinage, there
was no simple method for proving that the certifier's judgment —his ex
ercise of power —was faulty, certainly not in the way that an audit could
reveal maladministration in the accounts of a citizen magistrate. Of
course, it would have been possible to convene a board of people who
were believed to be able to distinguish genuine from imitation coins, as
indeed from base metal alloy forgeries, and have them give the certifier
a test to see if he could distinguish imitations that had been previously
identified by the board and then mixed in with genuine coins in a kind
of official shell game. Some such method may even have been used in
selecting slaves to become certifiers in order to weed out slaves who ap
peared to have the ability to do the job from those who did not. But this
need for elaborate tests: the appearance, feel, weight, ring and even the smell of coins were
the basis of a judgment which with practice must have become subliminal."
71 See above, n. 22.
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mechanism for control would have been cumbersome for regular use,
and there is no indication that a certifier ever worked as part of a
board.72 The law implies that each certifier worked alone.
In any case, the task of distinguishing genuine silver coins from imita
tions did not lend itself to scientific accuracy under the technological con
ditions prevailing in ancient Athens. There was enormous room for
disagreement and dispute under any circumstances. A check on the work
of a certifier would have been a far less precise and manageable affair
than, say, the audit of the financial records of a citizen official. Control
of the certifiers in the end would have reflected only the general power
of the state to control its slaves, not a regular control on the power of
the certifier to make decisions on his own, a power which by its nature
remained immune to simple or regular review.
A further question then arises from the remarkable double anomaly
that certifiers were slaves making decisions about the property of citizens
and other free persons and because the power of these slaves was essen
tially not subject to review on objective, easily establishable criteria. Why
did the Athenian government not fill the post of certifiers with citizens
or metics (resident aliens)? In the case of citizens, the traditionally low
social status that Athenian upper-class citizens ascribed to financial ac
tivity as an occupation probably would have made many Athenian men
reluctant to serve in the post of certifier.73 In keeping with this cultural
bias, for example, citizens largely shunned the roles of banker and money
changer, leaving those trades to non-citizens like the famous Pasion, an
ex-slave, or to metics. One Greek comedian of the fourth century placed
bankers at the head of a list of malefactors, labeling them the most
abominable breed of all, more despicable even than fish mongers.74 In
Aristotle's vision of the ideal city-state, "the citizens must not lead the
life of workers or merchants, for this kind of life is ignoble and contrary
to virtue."75 And acquiring wealth by exchange, Aristotle declared, "is
rightly censured; for it is not according to nature, but involves people
72 In fifteenth-century Venice, by contrast, the Assay Office had a board of three
assayers. Binding decisions on the purity of precious metal normally consisted of the agree
ment of two out of the three officials concerning the case at hand. See Lane and Mueller,
Money and Banking (above, n. 5), pp. 147-51.
73 See R. Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les cites grecques (Leiden, 1968), pp. 386-97.
74 Antiphanes fr. 159 Kock (Athenaeus 6.226d-e).
75 Pol. 7, 1328b39-41.
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gaining from one another."76 Furthermore, the restriction that the cer
tifiers always had to be at work meant that such a job would have left
no time for the social and political activities that the propertied citizen
regarded as part of his very identity. Xenophon, for example, condemn
ed the occupations that left citizens "no free time in which to attend to
their friends or their city-state; those who practice such occupations seem
to be bad at being useful to their friends and as defenders of their
homelands."77
These social views naturally reflected the sensibilities and expectations
of the minority of the male citizens at Athens who possessed enough
income-producing property that they did not have to work for wages to
earn a living. Among the pool of poor men who made up the majority
of Athens' male citizenry and metic population, there were surely those
who would have been willing to endure the snobbish sneers of the rich
in order to earn a salary as one of the city's certifiers of the coinage. Why
were they not hired? It is difficult to say whether financial considerations
entered into the decision. Buying a public slave to do the job could have
made good financial sense for the city-state if his purchase price and his
daily payments added up in the long run to a smaller expenditure than
the wages that would have been paid to a free man in the position. In
a sale of confiscated slaves that took place in 414, for example, the most
expensive slave was a Carian goldsmith priced at 360 drachmas.78 A cer
tifier would presumably not have cost more than that amount. An in
scription of 329/8 records a daily payment to public slaves that amounts
to half a drachma.79 Regular wages, by comparison, seem to have been
on the order of one-half drachma a day for unskilled workers and one
drachma for skilled workers by the late fifth century, but they rose to
one and a half for the former and two to two and a half for the latter
by 329/8, as the same inscription reveals.80 If a slave certifier who cost
360 drachmas was paid a half a drachma a day, while a free man would
76 Pol. 1, 1258bl-2.
77 Oec. 4.2-3.
78 A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B. C. , Russell Meiggs
and David Lewis, eds. (Oxford, 1969), p. 247.
79 IG ii2 1672. See above, n. 61.
80 P.J. Rhodes (above, n. 46), p. 691. As Rhodes comments with respect to the daily
allowance of half a drachma paid to Athenian jurors, such an amount was "inadequate
as compensation for earnings" by the later fourth century B.C. A public slave expected
to support himself on that amount would be a comparative bargain for the city-state.
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have earned one drachma, the state would have broken even on its in
vestment after only 720 days. A slave certifier could have been expected
to last a lot longer than 720 days. Slaves who were hired out by their
masters, however, could earn the same daily wage as free workers.81 If
a certifier had to be paid at the same rate as a free man, it would have
been cheaper to hire a citizen or a metic, whose employment would not
have incurred any purchase price as a start-up cost. Unfortunately, we
cannot make a reliable calculation about the cost effectiveness of using
public slaves as certifiers because the law of Nicophon does not reveal
how much a certifier was to receive.
In any case, I suspect that a different consideration, which stemmed
from the very nature of the work of certification itself, is considerably
more significant in trying to understand why the certifiers were not citizens
or metics than is any estimate of the costs associated with providing the
service. The Athenians took the protection of their currency seriously:
a law mandated the death penalty for counterfeiters.82 At the same time,
as we have seen, the decisions made by the certifier of coinage necessari
ly lay outside any easy or regular system of citizen control. The changed
conditions brought on by the appearance of imitations in Athenian cir
culation made the certification of Athenian coinage a more problematic
activity than ever because imitations of silver in good style could be so
difficult to distinguish from authentic Athenian coins. Under these con
ditions, the certification of the coinage posed a special problem of the
allocation of power for Athenian democracy because it necessitated one
person exercising a largely unauditable power over others in a way that
did not fit with the normal practice of that system. The certification of
coinage was a process for which there was essentially no opportunity to
institute the kinds of checks to be performed by other citizens on those
exercising power that normally characterized the practice of Athenian
democratic government. A certifier could be punished for not showing
up for work where and when he was supposed to, or for exacting illegal
fees, or for taking bribes, but his power as enshrined in his judgment
per se on the status of coins was beyond punishment because it existed
outside the effective control of the state or of individual citizens. Athe
nian democracy was a system that characteristically rejected the invest
ment of such power in individual citizens, to say nothing of metics.
81 M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An In
troduction (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), no. 73, p. 276.
82 Demosthenes 20.167; cf. 24.212-213.
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Ironically, then, the special kind of power invested in the post of of
ficial certifier of the coinage, so difficult to subject to regular scrutiny
in traditional Athenian fashion, was better invested in an unfree person
like a slave than in a citizen or a metic. The slave's marked lack of power
as a person, the result of his lack of citizen status and its rights, counter
balanced his power of decision on the job. For this reason, a slave, unlike
a citizen, could be disciplined and punished without any proof at all having
to be offered of his not having done his job correctly, proof that would
have been impossible to obtain so far as the status of imitations and clever
ly alloyed forgeries was concerned.
It is a mark of the special nature of silver coinage in ancient Athens
that it accentuated the anomalous situation of the dokimastes, the one kind
of public slave who had the power to make decisions affecting the pro
perty of citizens. And we should not be surprised that coinage could create
such an anomaly in Greek culture. After all, as the law of Nicophon
testifies, coins found to be false were not simply destroyed, but rather
put under the safekeeping of a divinity to keep them out of circulation,
almost as if they were objects with a pernicious magic power that had
to be kept in thrall by a greater power. The story of the dokimastes and
his anomalous power emphasizes that in ancient Athens, coinage and
power were linked in ways that went beyond the conventional historical
relationship between money and influence in human society.83
KEY TO THE PLATE
1. Fifth century Athenian tetradrachm (ANS).
2. Fourth century Athenian tetradrachm (ANS).
3. Plated tetradrachm (ANS).
4. Subaerate tetradrachm with cut (ANS)
5. Imitation tetradrachm (ANS).
6. Emergency Athenian bronze (ANS).
7. Emergency Athenian gold diobol (ANS).
8. Plated tetradrachm (Agora H-1936).
9. Imitation with cut (ANS).
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